Crisis in Rakhine and Concern for India’s Northeastern Region

Image Courtesy: Reuters, via VOANews

After the border stand-off at Doklam came to an end under terms of agreement not yet clear, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi has left for his three-day visit to China to attend the BRICS Summit. Modi is scheduled to stop at Myanmar for his first bilateral tour to the neighbouring nation on his return. The hour seems to be most opportune for a visit to Myanmar given the ongoing crisis in the Rakhine state. The Rakhine state in Myanmar has been occupying headlines since August 25, accruing to outbreak of violence triggered by an attack on police and army posts in the state’s western flinches, allegedly by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). ARSA, a militant group of the minority Rohingyas, claims the attack – apparently their largest so far – to be a pre-emptive, defensive move against the escalating high-handedness of the Burmese security forces over Rohingya civilian population in addition to the militant group. The matter has been fast making space in international consciousness and has eventually also been penetrating across media discourse in India. UNHCR reports claims an approximate number of 58,600 Rohingya on flight after the attacks. More than 400 people have been reportedly killed. The recent attacks find their roots in the history of denial – by the Burmese army and eventually the Buddhist dominated Burmese state – of the recognition to the minority, Muslim Rohingyas. The conflict, thus pitches the Rohingyas and the Burmese state at two ends. The genealogy of the conflict is a matter of overwhelming complexity given the contradictory set of arguments from both the sides and hence calls for greater engagement elsewhere. The primary concern of this article is the probable vulnerability of India’s northeastern region accruing to the distress across the international border.

Although India in the pursuit of standing out as a benign rising power has granted refuge to some Rohingyas escaping persecution, beyond that the crisis has been seen by New Delhi as Myanmar’s internal affair. The Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju had mentioned in the Parliament on August 9, the intention of tracking and deporting illegally staying Rohingyas. However members of the civil society have outright taken up the issue which has led to the filing of a plea with the Supreme Court challenging the decision to deport the illegal Rohingyas. New Delhi at this critical juncture seems to find itself at a major foreign policy dilemma vis-à-vis Myanmar. On the one hand, New Delhi’s synergy with the Burmese government and the military in pursuit of getting its infrastructure and strategic ends meet prevents India from taking a bold stand towards the Rohingyas. Myanmar, without denial is the primary catalyst in New Delhi’s aspiring equations of reaching out to Southeast Asia. With the new wave of optimism fuelled in by the present political dispensation in India while upgrading the Look East Policy to Act East, Myanmar becomes even more strategically relevant. After successive denial by Bangladesh to grant a convenient transit through its territory, Myanmar’s acceptability on the same had immense leverage for promoting better connectivity of India’s landlocked northeastern region. Above all the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project is of utmost relevance for Mizoram in particular and the entire northeastern region in general. Yet another transport project expected to provide a greater connectivity boost to the region is the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway project. The project proposes to connect Moreh in Manipur with Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar. In addition to the infrastructure leverage, a stable and ‘friendly’ Myanmar ensures greater strategic dividends for New Delhi. Marking its presence across Myanmar in a way also helps in keeping China away from the strategic Bay of Bengal. It goes without saying that, for all these to deliver, New Delhi has to have a win-win engagement with Naypyidaw which in no ways seems to be possible while simultaneously taking a positive stand towards the Rohingyas. This perhaps justifies New Delhi’s superficial engagement with the plight of the Rohingyas.   

On the other hand the vulnerability of the escalating conflict across the border translates somewhat to the northeastern region of India. While the Indian mainland seems to be comfortably tucked away from the possibilities of cross-border spillover of the conflict, the northeastern region of India however stands exposed to greater vulnerability. First-thing-first, the endearing and escalating conflict in the Rakhine state directly impacts the Kaladan project. The multi-modal transit project has the following stretches – the sea route across Bay of Bengal from the port in Kolkata to Sittwe in Myanmar, the riverine route from the Sittwe port to the Inland Water Terminal at Paletwa, the road route from the IWT Paletwa to the India-Myanmar border in Myanmar, the remaining road route from Indian side of the border till it connects the erstwhile NH-54 in Mizoram. The major infrastructure hub under the project, i.e. Sittwe unfortunately happens to be the capital of the Rakhine state, which in this case is the epicenter of the conflict too. Although New Delhi’s apparently ‘benign’ approach towards Naypyidaw allows greater penetration for Indian infrastructure across the border, a troubled Rakhine state with an unsettled Rohingya crisis is directly proportionate to the vulnerability of optimisms for the northeastern region which was projected to be the greatest beneficiary of the Kaladan Project.

The conflict has reportedly put on flight waves of migrants – both Muslims and Buddhists – escaping the chaos. As per a report of December 2015, “as the persecuted Rohingya Muslims flee Myanmar, some of them have found their way into Assam”. Reportedly 28 Rohingya Muslims had at that time been apprehended and put into various detention camps across the state. Given the manifold rise in the magnitude of the conflict at this time, the numbers too are obvious to rise. For a state and a region inundated under the plight of cross-border migration for entire stretch of post-colonial history the political implications of a newer wave of migrants is left for consideration to the poll-pundits. India, unlike Bangladesh shares no direct border with the Rakhine state of Myanmar but does share the border with the immediately neighbouring Chin state at Mizoram and Manipur and further north at Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh with Sagaing and Kachin. In addition to direct vulnerability of the exodus, there remains the threat of circular spillover of growing pressure on Bangladesh which anyways struggles to accommodate its own domestic issues. In addition, the northeastern region of India has had a history of illicit drug smuggle and strong bonding among militant groups across the border. Before the multiplying grievance across the border propels the search for cross border sympathies New Delhi must intervene to mitigate the crisis while sustaining its win-win relations with Naypyidaw.