North Korea’s Growing Nuclear Engagements: Give Diplomacy a Chance

Image: News Republica

The United States (US) Pacific Command reported on March 22, 2017 about a failed North Korean missile launch the very day. The launch came merely four days after North Korea (NK) had tested a rocket engine capable of being used for a long range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The failure has come up as a greater relief to the US given the speculations that NK is working on an ICMB capable of delivering nuclear warheads to US. South Korea’s Ministry of Defense said in a statement that “South Korea and the US are aware of the missile launch and to their knowledge NK’s missile was not successfully launched”. Although it is not explicit as of now about the type of the missile or the reasons for failure, the matter however has drawn immediate international engagements. What is crucial at this point is not the failure, if at all, to launch the missile but the clandestine engagement of NK with weapons of mass destruction for quite some time – of which the failed missile launch is just an instance. The fact that NK is anyways banned from any missile or nuclear tests by the United Nations and also that the county is already under sanctions for violating such a ban, makes the launch even more interesting. Irrespective of international sanctions, the country has been considerably increasing the frequency of missile and nuclear tests. Kim Jong Un said in January this year that the country already has excelled its ICMB capabilities. As mentioned above, on Sunday, March 19, NK had successfully tested a rocket engine which in a way is a “meaningful” sign of progress according to South Korean officials. On March 6, 2017, it had launched four ballistic missiles that flew about 1000km finally to land in Japanese territorial waters. The year 2016 alone had witnessed a total of 24 ballistic missile tests conducted by NK. The latest launch appears to have come up in the wake of the US envoy for NK policy Joseph Yun’s meeting with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul. The two had met reportedly to discuss an appropriate response to the North’s escalating weapons programs. The recent unfolding of events in NK could also be seen as the North’s way of responding to the annual US-South Korean joint military exercise that is currently underway. The 2017 iteration of the large scale annual exercise of the combined troops of South Korea and the US called Foal Eagle kicked off in Seoul earlier this month. Foal Eagle overlaps yet another exercise called the Key Resolve that begun on March 13 and the two are expected to run through April 2017. North had vehemently protested last year’s Foal Eagle-Key Resolve on ground that such drills might very well be rehearsals for a pre-emptive attack.

The question that arises at this juncture is how does a missile launch (successful or otherwise) by NK in anyways bother the world? In response to such a question it is essential for the world to recall that NK is a nuclear capable state that has already established its mark in the world nuclear scenario. The country has conducted five successful nuclear tests so far since it begun detonating nuclear devices in 2006. The country had tested one each in 2009 and 2013 and two in 2016 (January and September). North Korean sources claim the 2006, 2009 and 2013 tests to be atomic bombs and the 2016 January test to be a hydrogen bomb which in a way is even more powerful than the former. It requires mention here that once any nation comes up with adequate capabilities to build a bomb, all it needs next – to make itself vulnerable to the world – is a successful missile launch technology (ICBM or others) and a miniaturist version of the bomb capable of being loaded on to a missile. Now that NK has already established its capability to create a bomb, the successive attempts at missile launch are undoubtedly a matter of concern for the world community. As per reports, NK claims that it has successfully ‘miniaturized’ nuclear warheads. Nevertheless such capabilities have not yet been independently verified and hence there exists considerable doubts concerning the same as of now. The fact however remains that the recent failure to launch an ICBM in no ways is the end to the story. Given the continued engagement of NK it is obvious that the country would, over the years to come, develop capabilities to transfer nuclear warheads across the continent. The absence of any well highlighted Nuclear Doctrine - including measures such as No First Use - unlike India, NK is anyways a risky affair.

In attempt to escape growing antagonisms, the US, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea have intermittently been engaging NK in discussions called the ‘six-party talks’ since 2003. The talks aimed at denuclearizing NK are held in Beijing and chaired by China. The US and NK had entered into an Agreed Framework in 1994 according to which NK had pledged to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors. The agreement came to an end in 2002 after evidences of a secret uranium enrichment program of NK came to fore. Following this, NK expelled all international monitors and in 2003 withdrew unilaterally from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet another round of optimisms had made news in 2005 with NK agreeing to give up its nuclear ambitions. The optimisms ran down eventually with the successful nuclear tests of 2006 and 2009. The situation deteriorated since 2013 when in the wake of a war of words with the US and with US sanctions over the third nuclear test, NK vowed to restart all existing facilities to their fullest. The engagements kept accelerating henceforth and 2016 witnessed two successful nuclear tests by NK.

It is more than explicit as of now that sanctions and threats are of negligible relevance in deterring NK especially under the present political regime headed by authoritarian Kim Jong Un. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had said during his visit to Japan, South Korea and China that the erstwhile policy of ‘strategic patience’ with NK had ended and all opportunities including a ‘military one’ was on table in case North threatened South Korean or US interests. Despite such chest-thumping the use of conventional military force as an alternative appears to be unsuccessful. NK, it requires mention is no Iraq and it is uncertain as to whether a military strike would result in complete destruction of NK’s missile and warheads at once. NK is obvious to retaliate conventionally even if it loses its nuclear capabilities given that Seoul and US troops based in South Korea are pretty much within coverable range of Pyongyang. The expected cost in terms of money and life in such a situation is sure to deter South Korea from engaging directly or preventing US form doing so. Missile defense and nuclear deterrence, although popular during the Cold War are obsolete today given the uncertainties of success and unbearable cost of failure. Thus, the ultimate way out appears to be better negotiation with the current political regime in NK with active participation of Beijing. The need of the hour is to convey the catastrophic outcomes of a nuclear misunderstanding to the world in general and NK in particular. It is the collective responsibility of all countries to work towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. To adhere to such a responsibility calls for greater steps by greater nations. The NPT-designated nuclear weapons states namely China, France, Russia, US, UK must take initial steps towards denuclearizing their capabilities so as to create trust and motivate other nuclear capable states such as NK or India to move towards a nuclear-weapons-free world.